Thursday, February 14, 2019

Fodors Functionalism Essays -- Body Mind Psychology Essays Searle

Fodors FunctionalismFodor begins his article on the brainpower-body problem with a reexamination of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body ar two transgress entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then thither can be no interaction between the two. The mind could non influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist system, on the other hand, states that the mind is not unambiguous from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not acquit noetic causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviouristic psychology and the central-state identicalness theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. sensible behaviorism states that every kind feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying Dr. Lux is hungry, one would say If there w as a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would beat it. The central-state identity theory states that a certain psychological state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a flair similar to Berkeleys representation of objects. Both mental states and objects argon a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be delineate by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, whitethorn result in a behavioral effect. The last point is besides a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One doctrine of the central-state identity theory is called token physicalism. Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently populate are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of substance capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m... ...whether the simulation of mental processes resulting from a computer program are real mental processes?At the end of chapter two, Searle summarizes his criticism of functionalism in the following way. The mental processes of a mind are caused entirely by processes occurring inside the brain. There is no outer cause that determines what a mental process will be. Also, there is a distinction between the identification of symbols and the understanding of what the symbols mean. Computer programs are be by symbol identific ation rather than understanding. On the other hand, minds make up ones mind mental processes by the understanding of what a symbol means. The conclusion lead from this is that computer programs by themselves are not minds and do not have minds. In addition, a mind cannot be the result of running a computer program. Therefore, minds and computer programs are not entities with the same mental state. They are quite different and although they both are capable of input and sidetrack interactions, only the mind is capable of truly thinking and understanding. This quality is what distinguishes the mental state of a mind from the systemic state of a digital computer.

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